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Sibyllines as matricide] who will persecute the plantation, which the 
twelve apostles of the beloved have planted and of the twelve one 
will be given into his hands." I hope Dr. Smith will not deny the great 
prevalence of the Nero-redivivus legend in early Christian circles. 
7. Furneaux aptly remarks that the statement of Suetonius con-
cerning the punishment of Christians occurs among a whole list of 
police regulations for which Nero is commended. This may account 
for the short wording. 
8. As the tilt between Dr. S. and myself may fall into the hands 
of some who know me personally, I will say that I lay no claim to 
either a Ph. or D.D., for which my opponent erroneously assumes 
me. A. K. 
REMARKS ON DR. CARUS'S VIEW CONCERNING GE-
OMETRY. 
In an interesting essay published in The Monist of January, 
1910, Dr. Carus has attempted to explain the nature of mathe-
matical thought. Putting aside other points, he has mainly endeav-
ored therein to establish "the foundation of geometry without re-
sorting to axioms," which we could not but receive with hearty 
approval and close attention, because hitherto we have been com-
pelled to proceed with some set or other of axioms, or rather as-
sumptions, as we prefer to call them. If we could ever do away 
with them, how glad we would be! Nothing else in the domain of 
mathematics,—nay of any subject in the entire scope of science, 
could ever afford greater satisfaction to our esthetic requirements 
by which we are seeking simplicity in our scientific thought. But 
the case is not simple. We must first enter into a critical examina-
tion before we can give assent or dissent to this enticing view of 
Dr. Carus. 
On page 50 of his article we read: "If my conception of mathe-
matics is true we do not need in geometry a certain number of primi-
tive ideas supposed incapable of definition, and a certain number of 
primitive propositions or axioms, supposed to be incapable of proof." 
All this would be very well if it were really true as Dr. Carus 
maintains. In his Conclusion he feels confident that he has "fur-
nished a conception which satisfies all demands and will be con-
ceivable for all practical purposes," and further that "in the main 
(his) solution is on the right track." But in spite of all he has 
said we are compelled to doubt whether he is certainly right. Mathe-
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maticians who are interested in the philosophical considerations of 
their subject would perhaps not be readily persuaded that their theo-
retical demands have been satisfied by this conception thus promi-
nently set forth by a celebrated philosopher. 
If Dr. Carus desires to do away with all axioms, he must base 
his considerations upon something, or however gifted he be in the 
art of thinking, he could not build his castle entirely in the air. 
Thus a cornerstone of his construction lies in his conception of 
motion. On pp. 37-38 he says: 
"We cancel in thought everything particular which comprises 
all things concrete, be they of matter or energy, and retain only 
our mental faculty of doing something, including a field of action 
implied by the possibility of moving about." 
Here Dr. Carus has unconsciously introduced an assumption 
or assumptions. Does he not assume "the possibility of moving 
about"? The form of his assumption becomes exceedingly clear 
when he says: "We can move in any direction and everywhere with-
out end" (pp. 39-40). Moreover this statement is not a single as-
sumption only, but it contains a group of assumptions. 
Of the numerous assumptions Dr. Carus has tacitly made in the 
course of his argument, we shall content ourselves to point out a 
single one. He says on page 40, that "we can draw straight lines 
in differenf directions." It is clear that this statement implies an 
assumption. We shall not speak of various primitive ideas em-
ployed by Dr. Carus, that appear to us to be incapable of definition, 
and stated without any attempt at description. 
"Mathematics is a creation of pure thought," Dr. Carus rightly 
remarks (p. 34). "We do not find a plane anywhere in actual life, 
we construct it; and in the same sense straight lines and right 
angles are the products of our construction" (p. 41). All these 
statements recommend themselves to us as very just, but Dr. Carus 
does not seem to be always considering geometry in such a purely 
a priori way. In his opinion, "motion is indispensable for any space 
conception" (p. 72). But what is motion as he conceives it? Does 
it not seem to be more "concrete" than to be a "pure thought" ? It 
may well answer for the orientation of our conception of a physio-
logical space; it is nevertheless not always necessary for our purely 
mental construction of mathematical space, as we can see in the 
different systems actually established by various mathematicians. 
He says further (p. 74) that "after all, our notion of space is 
ultimately based on the self-observation of our own motion; (and) 
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without motion no space-conception." This may be very true, and 
we are highly interested with the deep significance of the statement. 
But it applies only when we have to investigate the origin of our 
space-conception; it is not positively necessary in our a priori con-
struction of any system of geometry. At any rate the idea of motion 
need not be very conspicuous in such a construction. His statement 
is of profound significance only with reference to the statement: 
"Our notion of space is ultimately based on our senses. Without 
senses no space-conception." 
Despite all that, however, Dr. Carus maintains (p. 74), "Pure 
mathematics does not depend upon the senses but is the product of 
the mind." If this is so, will it not be possible for us also to form 
our purely formal conception of space in our mind without re-
sorting to any notion of motion, however conspicuously the latter 
may have contributed in originating the notion of space in the more 
or less physiological ground of the formation? This is certainly 
the reason why motion has not played a conspicuous part in the 
construction of the now existing systems of geometry. 
It is true, that Dr. Carus does not refer to real motion, for on 
pages 71-72 he says, "This general idea of motion. . . . is not real 
motion, but the thought of motion." But it is very doubtful whether 
we are able to conceive lines, angles, triangles etc., as "the purely 
a priori constructions of it." 
Notwithstanding all that he has said, I cannot help wondering, 
if he were not thinking in a more or less "concrete" manner, not in 
"pure thought" only? His notion is true perhaps "only so far as 
our physiological space-conception is concerned." In any case Dr. 
Carus is unknowingly prepossessed of a conception of space in a 
way analogous to the Euclidean system, which is endowed with 
something of objective concreteness. We shall hear what he him-
self says (p. 75) : 
"We are not able to visualize some of the non-Euclidean spaces, 
which means we cannot form definite sense-perceptions of them." 
Here it appears he is assuming that Euclidean space has been 
ratified by our senses. Further he says on page 74: 
"If rational beings, differing from ourselves, have developed 
on other planets, they might have different notions of physiological 
space than we have, but they would have the same logic, the same 
arithmetic, the same geometry, and all the complications derived 
therefrom." 
It is very strange that Dr. Carus should consider there ought 
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to be only one geometry, whereas we have various systems. We who 
inhabit the surface of one and the same planet have already con-
structed different geometries, and so why should there not be a 
possibility of the inhabitants of other heavenly bodies constructing 
other systems than one of those common among us ? There may be 
beings who have attained a much higher degree of evolution than 
we; their mental faculties may transcend ours in an incredible 
degree of perfection. Are we not then utterly incapable of even 
imagining what kind of space-conception they may have formed? 
Dr. Carus's position is too dogmatic when he uses such a statement 
as that above quoted. 
As to arithmetic, there may be various systems, such as those, 
for instance, where the laws of association or commutation do not 
hold. 
Dr. Carus says on page 46: 
"But if space is a scope of motion, I cannot think of a space 
that is limited. Spherical space ought to be conceived as possessed 
of a spherical drift, but for that it ought to be infinite. If it is not 
infinite, I would ask the question, what is outside?" 
Here the Euclidean space is most evidently predominating in the 
mind of the author, and in consequence he proves to be prejudiced 
in his considerations. A finite space is only finite; there need be 
nothing which would involve any conception requiring us to think 
of what is outside. If we could think of what is outside a finite 
space, the space would not be finite. Being prepossessed with the 
conception of the infinite Euclidean space in his mind he is little 
entitled, it appears, to truly conceive the intrinsic significance of a 
finite space. 
If Dr. Carus says on page 49, "s ince . . . . there are no points, 
lines, surfaces, planes, etc., in the objective world, it is obviously 
impossible to test the truth of Euclidean propositions by actual 
measurement," this would lead theoretically to the conclusion that 
any geometrical systems ever conceived in pure thought are all 
correct in their a priori significance. But if we were to consider 
space as finite and that the length of a whole straight line were not 
greater than the circumference of the earth's equator, for instance, 
although this might be logically very correct, it would never answer 
for practical purposes. If however geometrical systems are con-
structed to suit the demands of our actual life, we must make a 
selection as to the best system or systems that would be most con-
venient for our practical or concrete life. As a matter of course 
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pure mathematics has little or nothing to do with these things; but 
in order to secure the concrete application of geometrical systems 
we must first apply the a posteriori judgment of experience. Noth-
ing obliges us to conclude that geometry is inapplicable to concrete 
purposes, because no such things as points, etc., are found in the 
actual world. 
If the geometrical space be "a universe of pure thought" and yet 
"a model" serving "for any possible formation, fictitious or real," 
it would be only too evident that a model could be tested as to 
whether it would answer our purpose or not. 
Dr. Cams condemns the tendency which he calls" experimental-
ism" met with in some mathematicians, who have raised questions 
such as these: 'Will not a straight line finally, after billions of miles, 
. . . . return into itself ?' or, . . . . 'Are the opposite angles in a paral-
lelogram really equal?' o r . . . . ' I s space Euclidean or non-Euclid-
ean?'. . . . " (pp. 34-35). Dr. Carus takes all these as proving "that 
those who propose t h e m . . . . do not understand anything of the 
foundations of mathematics" (p. 35). But here Dr. Carus, it seems, 
has confounded theoretical considerations with the practical appli-
cations of the theories. Some mathematicians, like Poincare, think 
that every geometrical system has a significance for us, while others, 
among whom I may mention L. Harzer, believe otherwise, imagin-
ing that actual or objective space may be really limited. Which 
way of thinking is the better of the two, is a subject which we are 
not yet able to decide. When I speak in this way, Dr. Carus and 
his disciples may count me among those who do not understand the 
foundations of mathematics. I may well be among them; but in 
my opinion the question lies altogether outside of the domain of 
pure mathematics and only concerns the practical side of life. A 
logical construction and its practical application must not be con-
founded in any case. 
For Dr. Carus "both objective existence and our thought.. .will 
be analogous" (p. 39), if consistency dominate both. This is cer-
tainly the positivist's view and can exercise little authority over 
those who are not upholders of the positivistic principles. There 
is consistency between objectivity and our thought, because the 
former is systematized by the latter. It is therefore not proper to 
conclude that both are analogous because consistency governs both. 
It is very natural that Dr. Carus who is a positivistic philosopher 
should consider "the formal laws of the universe" as "a part of 
objective reality." But formal laws have no further significance for 
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us than as they are developed in our subjectivity. The idea is as 
absurd as if we should say that the number three is a part of a 
group of three persons. Three is not in any way comparable with 
three persons. 
Dr. Carus is very right when he says (p. 63 ) : 
"The problems concerning the foundations of geometry and of 
mathematics in general are by no means so definitely settled that 
one solution may be said to have acquired the concensus of the 
competent, and for this reason I feel that a little mutual charity is 
quite commendable." 
Thus, if I may differ somewhat in opinion from Dr. Carus, I 
must openly beg his charity for advocating my own views against 
him. I may have been led to these discussions "by an enthusiasm 
as strong as the zeal of religious devotees which . . . . has a humorous 
aspect," but I am of the firm belief that they will perchance "serve 
to widen the horizon of his views," although not endowed with the 
positive power of "reversing, antiquating or abolishing the assured 
accomplishment" of Dr. Carus. 
With us it is never "strange that the nature of man's rationality 
is by no means universally recognized." It seems very natural that 
"opinions vary greatly concerning its foundation and its origin." 
We are quite satisfied with the coexistence of various different sys-
tems, and so we shall be always happy to receive varying criticisms. 
YOSHIO MIKAMI. 
OHARA IN KAZUSA, JAPAN, March, 2, 1910. 
EDITORIAL COMMENT. 
On a first perusal of Mr. Yoshio Mikami's criticism of my views 
concerning the foundations of geometry, I thought that no reply 
would be needed for any one who has read my main expositions of 
the problem, the article in question as well as my books Kant's Pro-
legomena and The Foundations of Mathematics. But I am anxious 
to let every criticism receive consideration, and so I take pleasure 
in publishing Mr. Mikami's remarks. Since, however, many of our 
readers have not read the writings under discussion, I will briefly 
point out why Mr. Mikami's arguments fail to apply to my position. 
It is true enough that I propose to lay the foundation of geom-
etry without having recourse to axioms. However I have not for 
that reason, as Mr. Mikami says, "unconsciously introduced an as-
sumption or assumptions," but I build all the formal sciences upon 
the facts of our own existence. In doing so I simply follow the 
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